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Antonio Gramsci: Persons, Subjectivity and the Political 
Robert P. Jackson 
 
Antonio Gramsci has been widely acknowledged to be one of the most significant political 
theorists of the 20th century.1 His concepts influence a wide and growing range of intellectual 
fields extending from linguistics, geography and anthropology, to cultural theory, subaltern 
studies, International Relations theory and beyond. Yet, as Michel Foucault once observed, 
Gramsci is an author who is ‘more often cited than actually known.’2 This situation, at one 
time unavoidable, is now contingent thanks to the ongoing publication of various critical 
editions of his writings and the growing philological work of successive generations of 
international Gramsci scholars, particularly those in Italy.3 While Gramscian concepts 
continue to find purchase across this kaleidoscope of intellectual disciplines, the historical-
theoretical laboratory of the Sardinian’s Prison Notebooks remains an underexplored resource 
through which to articulate the complex interrelationship between subjectivity and the 
political.4 The prevalent image of Gramsci in the anglophone world as a theorist of hegemony 
often reduces this term to a rather limited and partial sense.5 These readings frequently note 
Gramsci’s substantial contribution to our understanding of the macro-processes of state 
formation and its apparatuses, but they often overlook his equally insightful framework for 
analyzing the micro-processes of the transformation of society. I will suggest that a 
comprehension of these ‘molecular’ micro-processes is vital for a full appreciation of the rich 
contribution made by Gramsci to our understanding of the relationship between subjectivity 
and the political. In particular, a central focal point of Gramsci’s Notebooks, the nexus 
between philosophy and politics, retains a power to provoke stimulating encounters with 
more contemporary thinkers. This chapter will elaborate the relationship between subjectivity 
and the political by examining a constellation of concepts (individuality, personality, 
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conformism) deployed by Gramsci to articulate his conception of subjectivity in his prison 
writings.  
A major difficulty of realizing Gramsci’s contribution in this regard is that he tends to 
withdraw from explicitly formulating his theory using the language of ‘subjects’ as such. 
Thus, Peter Thomas contends that Gramsci’s Notebooks involve ‘a rejection of philosophies 
of the subject’ in favor of an alternative tradition based on the concept of the ‘person.’6 
Beginning with a characterization of his predominantly pre-intentional notion of 
‘subjectivity’ and its inseparability from ‘objectivity’ in his thought, I examine Gramsci’s 
conceptual shift from the language of subjects to that of persons and a theory of personality. 
Locating the foundation of this move in his ‘politico-gnoseological’ theory of the ‘effective 
reality of human relations of knowledge,’7 I will then briefly outline the relationship between 
this theme and his wider conceptual framework (hegemony, ideology, common sense, etc.). 
On this basis, I will draw on recent scholarship8 to focus in more detail on the relationship 
between the individual and society in Gramsci’s Notebooks, exploring the distinctive 
conception of personality that emerges from his theory. This will allow me to study, on the 
one hand, the category of ‘molecular’ transformations in Gramsci’s writings, and, on the 
other, the nature of the agency that realizes social change: the formation of collective will. In 
so doing, I will pay specific attention to Gramsci’s analysis of collective organisms, and of 
the individual and collective category of ‘person’ to negotiate the ‘strangely composite,’ 
fractured and fragmentary character of the lived experience of subaltern groups under 
conditions of modernity.9 Finally, I will argue that Gramsci’s proposal for a ‘new 
philosophy,’ alongside a new culture that is ‘rooted in the popular consciousness,’10 continues 
to be relevant as a source for understanding the relationship between subjectivity and the 
political in our own time. 
 
3 
Gramsci and Subjectivity 
 
Given the privileged position of the political in Gramsci’s conception of the will, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that subjectivity takes on a collective form in the first instance.11 His Prison 
Notebooks are, among other things, a sustained reflection on the mass popular experiences of 
his time, whether in the form of the rationalized techniques of Fordism in the United States, 
the social experiments of the Soviets in Russia, or the rise of Fascism in his native Italy.12 In 
this context, we can note two distinctive features of his conception of subjectivity: its 
predominantly ‘pre-intentional’ character, and his extreme reluctance to countenance the 
speculative separation of ‘subjectivity’ from ‘objectivity.’ 
In his entry for ‘soggettivo, soggettivismo, soggettività’ [subjective, subjectivism, 
subjectivity] in the Dizionario gramsciano, Giuseppe Cacciatore examines the variety of 
fields in which Gramsci deploys the language of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘objectivity.’ He identifies 
a range of philosophical, political, historical and literary uses of these terms.13 Cacciatore 
demonstrates that Gramsci articulates the subjective dimension of his thought in different 
senses in an extremely wide-ranging semantic field.14 However, Gramsci’s primary concern 
is to avoid succumbing to a speculative conception of subjectivity, rather seeking to realize a 
‘more objectified and concretely universalized subjectivity.’15 In the Notebooks, the 
subjective and the objective are always already intertwined. One can never disentangle in 
reality the objective and subjective conditions of history. For Gramsci, this binary distinction 
is ‘simply one of a didactic character.’16 On the contrary, in the creation of a collective will, 
the important factor is to analyze the ‘size and concentration of subjective forces,’17 and 
therefore the ‘dialectical relation between conflicting subjective forces.’18 We find Gramsci’s 
conception of subjectivity at all times suffused within a wider analysis of the conflict between 
social forces. In Gramsci’s political thought an account of this struggle is necessary to 
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illuminate the connection between the process of the constitution of individual and collective 
subjectivities. 
Guido Liguori suggests that it is the ‘constant cross-referencing of the subjective and 
objective that makes for a great part of the fascination (and the difficulty) of his work.’19 For 
Gramsci, subjects (principally class actors) do not emerge in a pure form or ex nihilo, but in a 
complex and dynamic terrain, a conflicting field of social forces. While Gramsci at times 
accents different moments of ‘subjects, processes and forms,’20 in order to account for this 
complex of fields, his reflections are informed consistently by the fundamental configuration 
of a struggle between dominant and subordinate groups. Liguori also identifies a second 
aspect of Gramsci’s conception of subjectivity; namely, its predominantly pre-intentional 
character, ‘where the greater part of subjects are not mobilized, but defined (in their 
subjectivity, in their individual and collective way of being) by ideology.’21 Gramsci sought 
to theorize the lack of historical awareness, and thereby lack of autonomy, of the majority of 
the population. At the same time, his realist treatment of this lack of autonomy does not 
hypostatize it as an absolute, taking seriously the historical effectivity of ideologies embodied 
as popular beliefs and their potential for transformation.22 Gramsci’s reading of the Marxian 
concept of ideology and, more broadly speaking, his innovative interpretation of the doctrine 
of historical materialism is a terrain for the constitution of these subjectivities, and for the 
development of an original theory of persons and personality. 
Gramsci has at times been regarded as a ‘subjectivist’ thinker, whose criticisms of the 
‘mechanicism’ and ‘economism’ of the dominant trends of Marxism within the Second 
International has been associated with its opposite: a valorization of voluntarist agency. Thus, 
the influential objections to Gramsci’s ‘absolute historicism’ advanced by the French Marxist 
Louis Althusser assert that, despite its merits, the Sardinian’s thought falls within a trend of 
‘theoretical’ or ‘revolutionary humanism’ (shared by thinkers such as Georg Lukács and 
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Jean-Paul Sartre) that threatens to undermine the scientific qualities of Marxism.23 Taking 
this criticism as a starting point, Thomas returns to Gramsci’s texts to argue that Althusser’s 
claims are misdirected. According to Thomas, Gramsci cuts an unorthodox figure in 
contemporary discussions regarding subjectivity, since his articulation of the political 
withdraws from the conventional deployment of the category of the subject. Thus, following 
Valentino Gerratana,24 Thomas argues that 
Gramsci’s analyses operate with the much older and more ambivalent category of the 
“person [la persona],” or more precisely, a particular reformulation of this category 
that is not easily assimilated to the modern (epistemologically founded) discourses of 
the knowing subject that have often subsumed the older category.25 
Thomas traces the category of ‘person’ back to the Stoic tradition, which transposes the 
notion of a dramatic mask onto the domain of the ‘ethico-political’ as a means of accounting 
for ‘the various roles “played” by any one individual in the course of social life.’26 He then 
gives a typology of the bifurcation of this category into polarized currents. An exemplar of 
the first current is the Kantian conception of ‘the person as an “end” in itself,’27 rooted in ‘an 
internalization of reason as definitive of the human essence.’28 The second is understood 
through the Hobbesian distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ persons, where ‘any 
individual “represents”, in the form of a “person”, numerous social roles.’29 The tension 
between these traditions is that between a focus on interiority (consciousness) and exteriority 
(social relations/identity). In what follows, we will trace some of the distinct resonances 
between the latter tradition of exteriority and the Gramscian conception of the ‘person’ on the 
terrain of the modern State. However, this is not to suggest that Gramsci is silent on the 
questions of consciousness and interiority. While Gramsci’s approach to persons rejects the 
formulation of an original unitary human essence, which he sees as the residue of a 
‘theological’ conception,30 this does not logically entail the rejection of all processes of 
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externalization. Nevertheless, Gramsci favors viewing the ‘human’ as a point of arrival rather 
than a point of departure.31 He provides, as Thomas notes, ‘an ethico-political explanation of 
the unity posited by the theologically inflected concept’ of the person.32 
For Thomas, this conception provides an ‘anti-subjectivist’ vision of the ‘constitutive 
social and political over-determination of la persona [the person].’33 Gramsci develops this 
distinctive approach to the problems of philosophy by engaging in recurring dialogue with 
key texts by Marx, such as the Theses on Feuerbach,34 and the 1859 Preface to A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.35 Gramsci regards his own positions as an 
elaboration and unpacking of philosophical insights locked in the Theses on Feuerbach in 
aphoristic form. In particular, we can examine the foundations of his conception of 
subjectivity in relation to Marx’s contention that the individual is the ‘ensemble of the social 
relations.’36 Gramsci takes up this conception, as Thomas explains, exploring the ‘non-
identity of the individual’37 as a condensation or synthesis of these relations, ‘as a “composite 
body” in which the dynamics of the social formation are found to be at work in a “molecular” 
fashion.’38 We can explain Gramsci’s conception of philosophy more generally in relation to 
Marx’s eleventh thesis: ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; 
the point is to change it.’39 As Christine Buci-Glucksmann has argued, this polemical 
assertion of the unitary link between theory and practice is both an immediately political 
statement and the signal for a reconfiguration of our understanding of philosophy.40 It is 
therefore an important foundation for Gramsci’s conception of subjectivity and his attempt to 
remove what he sees as the encrustations of both mechanicism and voluntarism from Marxist 
thought. In this sense, Gramsci follows a path explored initially by the Italian philosopher 
Antonio Labriola. Drawing on the inspiration of Labriola’s reading of Marxism as a 
‘philosophy of praxis,’41 Gramsci attempts to develop a new way of conducting philosophy. 
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This ‘new philosophy’ has significant implications for Gramsci’s theory of knowledge,42 in 
which the foundations of Gramsci’s move from the subject to the person can be located. 
In contrast to epistemological theories that are concerned with the problem of the 
creation of knowledge, Gramsci operates with what has been called a ‘gnoseology of 
politics,’43 or a ‘politico-gnoseological’44 conception of knowledge.45 On the one hand, this is 
a conception of human knowledge as a practice, rather than a treatment of knowledge as a 
type of speculative and passive reflection. On the other hand, Gramsci is outspoken in 
rejecting the ‘residues of mechanistic thinking’46 that are inherent to conceptions that regard 
theory ‘as a “complement” of practice, almost as an accessory.’47 He therefore combines an 
emphasis on practice with the rejection of the reduction of theory to practice. Gramsci 
addresses this apparently contradictory combination of positions by formulating the problem 
of the unity of theory and practice as a historical process, ‘as an aspect of the question of the 
intellectuals.’48 For as long as intellectuals are treated as separate to the great mass of the 
population, the impression will persist of a separation between theory and practice that is, 
according to Gramsci, ‘a purely mechanical operation.’49 Thomas argues that this politico-
gnoseological conception deals with the ‘effective reality of human relations of knowledge.’50 
In an alternative formulation, Christine Buci-Glucksmann explains this conception as a dual 
process in which ‘philosophical positions have their effects in all practices,’51 and ‘all 
practices contain knowledge effects.’52 Buci-Glucksmann warns against reducing this 
conception of gnoseology to politics, or obscuring the connections between philosophy and 
politics. Rather, she argues that the ‘gnoseology of politics,’53 affirms ‘a new mode of 
functioning between knowledge, politics, and civiltà [civilization].’54 This conception is new 
in the sense that it neither privileges philosopher-intellectuals as custodians of knowledge, 
which they impart to the masses, nor does it reduce knowledge to an epiphenomenon of 
mechanically-determined economic forces. Rather, Gramsci seeks to reveal that his apparent 
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privileging of practice is an appearance produced only by the mechanical separation of theory 
and practice. For Gramsci, the novelty of his conception arises from conceiving the unity of 
these terms as a process of historical becoming, the creation of a ‘philosophical fact’ in the 
forging of the ‘theoretical-practical principle’ of a new hegemony.55 
This distinctive conception of knowledge has far-reaching consequences for 
Gramsci’s theoretical framework. The theory of personality that he develops from the 
conception of subjectivity associated with this perspective continues to resonate with 
contemporary thought. Thus, Thomas suggests that Gramsci’s turn to the ‘person’ represents 
‘a valuable touchstone for the assessment of “returns of the subject” and discussions of 
various forms of “individuation” in philosophical debates today.’56 Much of this more recent 
discussion emerges from the paradigms of structuralism and post-structuralism taking up a 
perspective that is critical of the type of theoretical humanism identified by Althusser above. 
While Gramsci advocates an understanding of the ‘philosophy of praxis’ as an ‘absolute 
humanism of history,’57 he explains this as an ‘absolute secularization and earthliness of 
thought.’58 In this view, the subject is not reliant on an essentialist framework, rather 
emerging from a conflicting terrain of competing hegemonies. This conception does not sit 
easily as an object of ‘anti-essentialist’ criticism, which is the perspective adopted by much 
of the more recent discussion of the political.59 Indeed, a re-assessment of Gramsci’s 
conception of the relationship between subjectivity and the political might provide resources 
to help us to assess critically the formalist ‘discursive’ reading of hegemony at times 
employed in these debates.60 
Before discussing Gramsci’s conception of the relationship between individuality, 
sociality, and his theory of personality, I will outline briefly the relationship between the 
theme of subjectivity and his wider conceptual framework. The Gramscian conception of 
subjectivity is one that formulates the possibilities for action in a historically constituted field 
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of forces. Gramsci analyzes this field of forces as a struggle for hegemony, surveying the 
competing projects through which classes seek to elaborate various elements of political 
power, of both leadership and domination. The subject of a hegemonic project is a class, but, 
as Liguori points out, there is an intimate relationship in Gramsci’s thought between 
hegemonic power and the State. For Gramsci, a class ‘must “become the State” if it is to be a 
true hegemon.’61 Here, he understands the ‘State’ to be an expansive ‘integral’ form, 
incorporating the twin elements of force and consent. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is a 
thoroughgoing materialist analysis of both ‘narrow’ public state power, the formal institutions 
of government, including the police, the army and administrative bureaucracy, and its wider 
‘so-called private’ forms in civil society, such as religious institutions, the press, trade unions, 
and wider civic organizations. Gramsci’s conception of politics and the State rejects a 
mechanical determination of subjectivity by the economy, understood as the determination of 
historical evolution by iron laws of necessity.62 Rather, Gramsci proposes a realistic analysis 
of relations of force that implies an interaction of factors that restricts the possible choices of 
a subject within a given situation. Gramsci explores different levels in the relation of political 
forces during the emergence of a hegemonic project, the first of which he refers to as the 
‘economic-corporate.’63 This represents a stage in which the ‘degree of homogeneity, self-
awareness and organization’64 of a social group or class is limited to the primitive defense of 
its economic interests. The elaboration of higher levels of the relation of political forces 
involves the ability of groups to take ethico-political initiatives on the terrain of the State, 
meaning the assertion of a socio-political leadership that brings ‘about not only a unison of 
economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity…not on a corporate but on 
a “universal” plane.’65 For Gramsci, these levels correspond to ‘various moments of 
collective political consciousness as they have manifested themselves in history up till 
now.’66 Within this framework, the terrain on which collective subjects develop an awareness 
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of their own projects is that of ideology. However, the constitution of subjectivity is not 
simply the acquisition of a certain consciousness on a rationalist-Enlightenment model, but 
rather the elaboration of a ‘conception of the world,’67 understood as a transformation of both 
ways of thinking and acting, and organized as a material force through its apparatuses. As 
Liguori explains, the ‘trenches and earthworks’68 of these apparatuses are ‘re-elaborated, 
adapted and propagated’69 in everyday forms of life, and they relate ‘to the importance of the 
Notebooks’ extended conception of intellectuals and their social role.’70 
Gramsci’s conception of ideology, as a ‘cement’ preserving the unity of a ‘social 
bloc,’71 runs counter to the dominant understanding of the role of ideology in Marxism as an 
explanation of distorted and misleading views of the world. The origins of the latter 
conception of ideology are usually located in Marx and Engels’s German Ideology: ‘If in all 
ideology men and their circumstances appear upside down as in a camera obscura, this 
phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects 
on the retina does from their physical life-process.’72 Marx and Engels refer here to ideology 
as the inverted appearance of a historical life-process, in a form analogous to the inversion 
that takes place in the physical processes of the eye. This approach has provided the basis for 
a current within Marxism often referred to as a negative-critical approach to ideology. Later 
thinkers codified this negative theory of ideology with the notion of ‘false consciousness.’73 
While Gramsci’s notion of ideology is complex and multivalent in its usage, according to 
Liguori, it rejects the notion of ‘false consciousness’ and is essentially a ‘positive theory of 
ideology.’74 Gramsci does occasionally refer to being ‘liberated from the prison of ideologies 
in the bad sense of the word.’75 In the main however, Gramsci does not regard ideology as 
something illusory or false. Indeed he notes that the ‘bad sense of the word has become 
widespread, with the effect that the theoretical analysis of the concept of ideology has been 
modified and denatured.’76 For Gramsci, ideology is rather the ‘site of constitution of 
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collective subjectivity,’77 the formation of composite social bodies around which ‘revolves 
the “war of position” and struggle for hegemony with which all society is permeated.’78 This 
construction neither is the mechanical consequence of environmental factors, nor is it the 
product of the externalization of an idealistic core of autonomy. Rather, Gramsci seeks to 
trace the formation of a collective will from a concrete analysis of the historical processes of 
life, seeking to avoid succumbing to a speculative notion of the economy as a ‘hidden god’—
a quasi-Marxist form of metaphysics—, but as ‘the ensemble of social relations in which real 
people move and act.’79 According to Gramsci, this positive construction of a new hegemony, 
which seeks to develop into an ‘integral State’80 and not simply a ‘government technically 
understood,’81 must involve the elaboration of a ‘conception of the world.’82 This is, on the 
one hand, a vision elaborated theoretically by intellectuals on behalf of a social group, but, on 
the other hand, an expression of the ‘solidity of popular beliefs’83 of the mass of the group 
itself. Gramsci’s hostility to any form of speculation inclines him to reject any original notion 
of an essential ‘core’ of human autonomy. He asks us to consider whether the idea of the 
human being as a starting point is not in fact a ‘theological’ or ‘metaphysical’ residue. At the 
same time, Gramsci does not conceive of human subjects as being wholly constructed by 
their environment, since he would point out that these subjects are in fact an active and 
ongoing part of modifying that environment. Thus, according to Gramsci, ‘each one of us 
changes himself, modifies himself to the extent that he changes and modifies the complex 
relations of which he is the hub.’84 Gramsci always already situates these general reflections 
on humanity within the co-ordinates of a struggle between competing hegemonies, between 
dominant and subaltern. Gramsci’s writings are marked with a deep concern for the 
development of elements of autonomy and self-awareness among the subaltern groups. These 
groups are fundamentally passive, but their passivity is a social relation that is constituted 
through human activity. Their passivity is a product of the inclusion of subaltern groups as an 
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integral element of capitalist modernity.85 At the same time, this social relation is a 
fundamental obstacle to their potential emergence from their subaltern condition.86 
Gramsci attempts to grapple with this problem by acknowledging what Liguori 
describes as ‘the largely pre-intentional materials’87 through which he seeks to realize a ‘new 
subjectivity.’88 Gramsci develops a concept of ‘common sense’ in order to account for a 
popular form of embodied ‘deep knowledge.’ Contrary to the English meaning of ‘common 
sense’ as a positive practical attitude, Gramsci’s use of the Italian term senso comune 
[‘common sense’] has a more neutral meaning.89 As Kate Crehan explains, Gramsci’s 
‘common sense’ is the ‘accumulation of taken-for-granted “knowledge” to be found in every 
human community,’90 which ‘provides a heterogeneous bundle of assumed certainties that 
structure the basic landscapes within which individuals are socialized and chart their 
individual life courses.’91 Gramsci uses this concept in order to articulate the complex 
combination of intellectuals and masses in the process of subject formation. Despite its 
durability, common sense is something only relatively fixed and demonstrates a level of 
malleability that is empirically observable. According to Gramsci, in the formation of a 
collective will, it is both possible and necessary for intellectuals to guide a modification of 
‘common sense’ through a process of ‘intellectual and moral reform.’92 This involves 
locating the elements of what Gramsci calls ‘good sense’ [buon senso] within ‘common 
sense’ and rendering these elements more coherent.93 Here, Gramsci employs the concept of 
‘coherence’ in an innovative sense, not only to mean an increase of logical consistency, but 
primarily of historico-political efficacy, the raising of a group’s capacity to act.94 ‘Common 
sense’ therefore represents, for Gramsci, the point of departure on which any realistic 
conception of social transformation must be based. Gramsci’s conception of the political 
maintains a commitment to the active role of subjects and the formation of collective will, 
while conceiving that the subject is, as Liguori indicates, ‘the outcome of a complex and 
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intangible but nonetheless real combination’95 of the different social elements to which it 
belongs ‘often in a syncretic manner.’96 Based on this conceptual framework of hegemony, 
ideology and common sense, I will now address the relationship between individuals and 
society in Gramsci’s framework, from which he elaborates his innovative theory of persons 
and personality. 
 
Politics, the Individual and ‘Molecular’ Transformation 
 
Marx’s 1859 Preface to his A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy is often 
treated as the most condensed statement of the theoretical framework of ‘classical’ 
Marxism.97 In this text Marx employs a metaphor that conceives the relations of social 
production as an ‘economic basis’ on top of which ‘arises a legal and political 
superstructure,’98 a superstructure that corresponds with ‘definite forms of social 
consciousness.’99 This base-superstructure relationship has often been interpreted as a 
mechanical and metaphysical determination of ‘social, political and intellectual life’100 (the 
ideological forms of the superstructure) by the economy.101 While Gramsci’s political thought 
exhibits a framework with formulations familiar to ‘classical’ Marxism, he articulates these 
elements in a highly original and sometimes surprising manner. Gramsci’s ‘dilated’102 
account of social superstructures (plural) are certainly not epiphenomenal and crudely 
deterministic products of the economy. As Thomas explains, in Gramsci’s expansive 
formulation, the superstructures are not only legal and political forms, but ‘all of the forms in 
which classes know and comprehend the conditions of their struggle within a determinate 
social formation.’103 They are the result of all of the relationships between individuals in 
society that intersect on the terrain of the political struggle for hegemony.  
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Michele Filippini investigates the distinctive conception of individuality that we find 
in the Notebooks. On his reading, Gramsci treats individuality not as a general abstraction of 
universal characteristics, but ‘as something concerning the structure of the individual, that is, 
the individual’s composition from a series of organic, but also conflicting, interconnected 
parts.’104 The content of these various parts derives from the participation of the individual in 
various mass experiences, as a member of different social groups stratified from the local to 
the global level. For Gramsci, the individual is a complex composite of different types of 
‘collective man,’105 and therefore a center of interaction or a ‘hub;’106 a site at which these 
elements form an often contradictory and unstable equilibrium. Gramsci identifies the need to 
reform the concept of ‘Man in general’107 that derives from the Catholic conception of an 
individual as ‘well defined and limited.’108 Basing himself on the sixth thesis of Marx’s 
Theses on Feuerbach, which states that ‘the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each 
single individual,’109 Gramsci regards human nature not as a fixed concept, but as ‘the 
ensemble of social relations.’110 Gramsci expands on Marx’s thesis by using an 
archaeological metaphor, comparing the individual to a ‘walking anachronism, a fossil,’111 in 
which the historical process has left ‘stratified deposits.’112 Furthermore, Gramsci notes that it 
is sometimes social groups ‘that express the most developed modernity,’113 that ‘lag behind in 
other respects,’114 rendering them ‘incapable of complete historical autonomy.’115 The 
experience of these groups in particular is one of different competing hegemonies and various 
elements that are anachronistic to modernity. Thus, for Gramsci, the ‘human’ is not the 
expression of an original and unitary essence, but a ‘point of arrival,’116 or as Liguori noted 
above, ‘the subject is the outcome’ of a process.117 As Peter Thomas argues: 
Only at this point, as a result of a complex series of mediations, can we begin to talk 
of a “subject” or “human essence,” which nevertheless remains a type of heuristic 
shorthand for the processes it describes.118 
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Gramsci’s understanding of the historical forms of ‘individuality,’ first in the struggle of the 
bourgeoisie with feudal society and later in the developing conflict between different forms 
of collectivism and individualism (the ‘associational-individual’ and the ‘capitalist-
individual’)119 is part of a strategy for negating this notion of ‘Man in general.’ However, it is 
also a contribution to a process of constructing new forms of individuality. The conception of 
‘Man’ envisaged by the philosophy of praxis, according to Gramsci, is a ‘historical bloc of 
purely individual and subjective elements and of mass and objective or material elements 
with which the individual is in an active relationship.’120 Redolent again of the Theses on 
Feuerbach, for Gramsci, it is necessary to transform the ‘external world, the general system 
of relations,’121 in order to ‘develop oneself.’122 Man is therefore ‘a series of active 
relationships (a process) in which individuality, though perhaps the most important, is not, 
however, the only element to be taken in to account.’123 This leads us to his conception of 
society, including its relationship to the individual. 
We can infer Gramsci’s conception of the individual, on the one hand, from his 
negative criticisms of the monadic conception of ‘Man,’ indifferent to social relations, which 
he detects in both Catholicism and the philosophy of Benedetto Croce. On the other hand, 
Filippini notes that there are two positive aspects to Gramsci’s theory of the individual: first, 
a ‘historicity (or political quality) defining the contingency of each and every individual 
formation,’124 and second, ‘the sociality that sees social relations as a constituent element of 
an individual’s being.’125 According to Filippini, the combination of individuality (‘the 
specific element of each individual’) with sociality (‘the relations that determine said 
individual’) effectively constitutes an individual.126 I will explore further below the 
personality that an individual acquires out of this conflict. 
In the Notebooks, Gramsci places a great deal of emphasis on the centrality of the 
French cultural experience, including in its positivistic (Comte) and anti-positivistic 
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(Bergson) forms. In Gramsci’s reflections on the ‘social characteristics of individuality’127 
and its ‘social determinants,’128 Filippini argues that the Sardinian both draws on and 
contributes to a tradition of sociological thought developed by Émile Durkheim.129 Gramsci 
absorbs elements of this tradition, in a particular form fused with Marxism, through the 
mediation of the writings of the French syndicalist Georges Sorel. This confluence relates to 
a shared focus with Durkheim on the individual in ‘modern industrial society.’130 Here, the 
stability of the social order is dependent both on the ‘dynamic relationship between the 
individual and social elements of individuality’131 and on the ‘“social production of 
individuals”,132 who are differentiated from one another but rendered uniform in the 
masses.’133 While Durkheim and Gramsci share a number of characteristic features in their 
processes of argumentation, there are fundamental and illuminating differences. According to 
Filippini, Durkheim’s categories focus on the preservation of an ordered unity within society, 
whereas Gramsci emphasizes ‘the political actions of part of society on society itself,’134 
which ‘displaces the political within the sphere of partiality rather than that of 
universality.’135 Filippini argues that Gramsci extends a path pioneered by Sorel before him, 
namely using the ‘toolbox’ of French sociology while replacing ‘the “de-subjectivized” 
division of labor’136 of Durkheim with ‘a world view, an ethics and a new society’137 founded 
on labor.138 Gramsci’s conception of the acquisition of personality develops from a study of 
conflict and struggle in society, moving beyond the dislocated standpoint of a social scientific 
observer, whilst remaining cognizant of the challenges formulated by that discipline. 
The concept of ‘person’ [la persona] is not limited to the individual in Gramsci’s 
thought, but may refer to either an individual or a collective person.139 While Gramsci 
discusses individuality in relation to ‘objective’ social relations, his treatment of personality 
relates to an awareness of these relations, and the development of an historical autonomy 
through their modification and transformation. Thus, Gramsci states that ‘to create one’s 
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personality means to acquire consciousness of them [the social relations] and to modify one’s 
own personality means to modify the ensemble of these relations.’140 For Gramsci, 
consciousness can have a gradation, or ‘degree of profundity,’141 related to the extent to 
which it knows how to modify these relations, and achieving this consciousness to a certain 
extent already modifies them.142 Furthermore, it is not enough to know the ensemble of social 
relations in a synchronic manner; they must also be ‘known genetically, in the movement of 
their formation.’143 Thus, Gramsci argues that ‘each individual is the synthesis not only of 
existing relations, but of the history of these relations. He is a précis of the past.’144 Also in 
his pre-prison writings, Gramsci is deeply concerned with the personification of political 
leadership as the culmination of a historical process of development of a group, a selection 
process or a summary. Thus, Gramsci and Palmiro Togliatti, writing in the ‘Lyon Theses’ in 
1926, argue that the political autonomy of a group requires that it achieves ‘a physiognomy, a 
personality and a precise consciousness.’145 In this tri-partite structure, it would be a mistake 
to place personality exclusively on the subjective side of this formulation, solely in terms of 
consciousness. On the contrary, personality appears to play a mediating role between the 
development of a critical consciousness and the physical embodiment of a collective will in a 
living organism. This mediating role of personality lies at the intersection of the determining 
function of social relations and the emergence of an awareness of them. Gramsci’s theory of 
personality is therefore an element of his wider conception of knowledge, and his attempts to 
re-formulate its role in both realistic and ‘democratic’ terms. For example, the mediating role 
of personality seems to correspond to Gramsci’s formulation of a ‘passage from knowing to 
understanding to feeling’146 in the fusion of individual and mass elements. Thus, Gramsci 
argues that if the relation of leadership between intellectuals and ‘people-nation’ is one of 
‘organic cohesion in which feeling-passion becomes understanding and thence knowledge 
(not mechanically but in a way that is alive), then and only then is the relationship one of 
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representation.’147 The effective realization of a social force requires a ‘shared life’ in which 
the popular feelings of the mass and the intellectual element are united without resorting to a 
mechanical and coercive imposition of their relationship. Gramsci termed this reciprocal 
interaction between popular initiative and its intellectual organizers a ‘historical bloc,’148 the 
achievement of a unity between the structure and ensemble of superstructures.149 The 
emergence of such a ‘historical bloc’ is dependent on the overcoming of a state of 
‘incoherence’150 among those groups seeking to engage in a struggle over hegemony.151 For 
Thomas, Gramsci’s studies of the ‘social and historical determination of the person [la 
persona]’152 represent a kind of ‘anti-Platonist Platonic allegory’153 in which Gramsci returns 
to a limited cell-form in order to comprehend a wider perspective, in turn modifying the point 
of origin.154 His insights into the person ‘are “translated” into the register of the historical 
efficacy of philosophy—and then in turn “re-translated” back into terms of its instantiation in 
the individual as the elementary “cell” of hegemonic struggle.’155 
We can now discuss the importance of ‘molecular’ transformations for Gramsci’s 
conception of social transformation and the agency of those engaged in this process. 
According to Filippini, in the Prison Notebooks, there is an ‘isomorphism’ between 
Gramsci’s theory of personality and his theory of society. They are two expressions of a 
single problem.156 Thus, Gramsci does not counter-pose his account of personality formation 
and the micro-dynamics of social transformation with the macro-processes of the formation 
of the State and its apparatuses. Gramsci relates the practical functioning of individuals, who 
act as individuals despite the incoherence of their individuality, to the particular order that 
arises in modern industrial society. His reflections on personality both enrich and are 
enriched by his theory of society. A key element in the emergence of a new personality is 
Gramsci’s conception of ‘molecular transformations,’157 which are defined by Filippini as 
‘the slow, yet inexorable mutation of single elements within an organism (be it individual or 
19 
collective) that at a certain point metamorphose from quantitative to qualitative, and which 
redefine the nature and structure of the object in question.’158 Gramsci makes use of the 
conception of ‘molecular changes’159 to account for different historical phenomena. For 
example, he examines the political process of ‘transformism’ [trasformismo] during the 
Italian Risorgimento, in which conservative Moderate forces incorporated individuals from 
the radical Action party within a new order.160 Gramsci also studies the new production 
techniques of Fordism, which involved the conscious creation of a new type of worker by 
industrialists.161 In both of these examples, Gramsci deploys ‘the interpretative criterion of 
molecular changes’162 which ‘progressively modify the pre-existing composition of forces, 
and hence become the matrix of new changes.’163 
Gramsci also applies the concept of ‘molecular transformation’ to the process of 
adaptation and moral crisis, or the ‘catastrophe of character,’164 within an individual. In this 
form, ‘molecular transformation’ is a dangerous process in which the protagonist experiences 
a split personality. One part may be aware of the effects, but they serve cumulatively to 
undermine the entire will to resist this transformation. While Gramsci acknowledges that the 
phenomenon of ‘molecular transformation’ has existed in the past, he suggests that it is of 
key importance in modern society.165 In particular, we can distinguish the present form of 
‘molecular transformation’ as one that is consciously ‘calculated’166 and ‘prepared 
systematically.’167 The disaggregating effect of this ‘molecular’ process of transformation on 
the subaltern groups, Thomas notes, runs counter to Gramsci’s project that seeks to establish 
a more ‘coherent’ conception of the world.168 In order to address this struggle in more detail, 
we will explore Gramsci’s analysis of collective organisms. 
 
Collective Subjectivity and Collective Will 
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Gramsci’s reflections on the interaction between individual and collective forms of 
transformation develop an important line of enquiry into the nature of subjectivity in modern 
society. These concepts fit within his overall framework of a struggle between hegemonies, 
which plays out on the terrain of ideology. In Liguori’s formulation, ideology is ‘the site of 
the constitution of collective subjectivity, but also—in a more contradictory manner—of 
individual subjectivity, within the ambit of the struggle for hegemony.’169 In Gramscian 
terms, the nature of the agency that realizes social change is explored through the formation 
of collective will. Gramsci concentrates not only on the limitations that constrain an 
individual’s agency in society, but also on the means by which those limitations can be 
overcome through collective endeavor. Thus, he argues that ‘when the individual can 
associate himself with all the other individuals who want the same changes, and if the 
changes wanted are rational, the individual can be multiplied an impressive number of 
times.’170 This is not to say that Gramsci envisages collective organisms to be absolutely free; 
rather, they operate within a restricted field of forces. As Liguori states, an organism is 
capable of making choices according to ‘the (limited) possibility of the real choices in front 
of it.’171 In this sense, Liguori points out that the inspirations of Gramsci’s youth (Bergson, 
Gentile) are tempered in his Prison Notebooks by a reflection on the inertia and passivity 
embodied in the different forms of ‘common sense’ [senso comune] present in society.172 For 
Gramsci, the importance of ‘supra-individual organisms’ hitherto has been appreciated only 
in a ‘mechanistic and determinist manner,’173 indicating the legitimate source of some hostile 
reactions against them. By contrast, Gramsci envisages a conception in which ‘relations are 
seen as active and in movement’174 between ‘the societas hominum and the societas 
rerum,’175 or between ‘the society of “men” and the society of things: i.e. the human and 
natural worlds.’176 
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Gramsci’s ‘philosophy of praxis’ emphasizes the centrality of the ‘collective will,’ 
characteristic of a life-long rejection of what he described in his early writings as the 
contamination of Marxism by ‘positivist and naturalist encrustations.’177 Yet, in his later 
writings, Gramsci’s treatment of the collective will is increasingly concrete in its analysis of 
collective organisms within a field of forces. In Carlos Nelson Countinho’s estimation, the 
‘collective will’ continues to play ‘an important role in the construction of the social order, 
but no longer as formative of reality, rather as a decisive moment articulated with the 
determinations that derive from objective reality, in particular the social relations of 
production.’178 Gramsci criticizes the ‘abstract character’179 of Sorel’s concept of the 
‘political myth,’180 identifying not only the negative and destructive aspect of myth, but also 
its positive constructive potential. Thus, Gramsci demonstrates his appreciation for the 
historical achievements of the Jacobin forces in the French revolution, which were able to 
create a ‘national-popular’181 collective will (i.e., a new form of hegemony). This remains a 
project, albeit in a new post-Jacobin form,182 that Gramsci envisages for a ‘modern Prince,’183 
a political party adequate to the tasks organizing an ‘intellectual and moral reform’184 of 
modern society. Gramsci re-defines the collective will as ‘operative awareness of historical 
necessity, as protagonist of a real and effective historical drama.’185 On the one hand, the 
‘collective will’ must comprehend the stubborn historical and economic conditions on which 
arbitrary ventures can founder. The collective will is a ‘rational, not an arbitrary, will, which 
is realized in so far as it corresponds to objective historical necessities.’186 On the other hand, 
it must ‘make history’187 by awakening passions that can be only be given coherent 
expression by organizing a new form of culture. It must become, in Gramsci’s terms, ‘a 
culture, a form of “good sense,” a conception of the world with an ethic that conforms to its 
structure.’188 
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Fabio Frosini points out that for Gramsci there is a tendency in industrial society, born 
in the material organization of production and education, to render the norms of conduct and 
forms of life of the masses increasingly homogeneous, and orientated towards the production 
of standardized individuals.189 Gramsci explains that ‘we are all conformists of some 
conformism or other, always man-in-the-mass or collective man.’190 The struggle for 
hegemony is thus a struggle between different types of ‘conformism,’ representing a crisis of 
civil society. It would be arbitrary and unhistorical to propose a rejection of the process of 
‘conformism’ outright, which is, in any case, an impossibility in modern society. Gramsci 
rather advocates an intervention to organize a new form of ‘conformism’ from below, which 
would ‘allow new possibilities for self-discipline, in other words for freedom, including that 
of the individual.’191 A critical yet appreciative attitude towards the notion of ‘conformism’ is 
therefore central to Gramsci’s conception of ‘intellectual and moral reform.’192 In order to 
render both the individual and social group more coherent, it is necessary to develop an 
approach that takes ‘common sense’ as its foundation. Gramsci proposes to raise this 
disjointed and incoherent form, which arises from the subaltern groups’ experience of a 
dislocated and non-coherent present, made up of bizarrely composite elements of different 
conceptions of the world, to a coherent unity. Thomas locates its origins in the modern 
historical experience, where ‘the present is necessarily non-identical with itself, composed of 
numerous “times” that do not coincide but encounter each other with mutual 
incomprehension.’193 For Thomas, Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis gives ‘the practically-
focused [‘common sense’] senso comune a level of critical self-awareness regarding its 
historical determination that allows it to break with the incoherence and passivity imposed 
upon it by an incoherent present.’194 Gramsci proposes the figure of the ‘democratic 
philosopher’195 as the embodiment of this concrete new political perspective, a self-critical 
intellectual for whom an active relationship exists between her and the ‘cultural 
23 
environment’196 that she is attempting to modify. However, this practical transformation of 
philosophy, ‘forced to recognize its own foundation,’197 risks what Gramsci describes as the 
mummification of ‘common sense,’ the transformation of a ‘justified reaction into a 
permanent attitude.’198 
The challenge confronting this project, of re-constructing ‘collective man’ through an 
approach of ‘conformism from below,’ results from the dual nature of collective organisms 
found in Gramsci’s Notebooks. They are, as Filippini explains, both ‘organic mechanisms 
rebalancing the power system,’199 and at the same time ‘an independent expression of 
subaltern, potentially revolutionary demands.’200 Thomas alerts us to the way in which, for 
Gramsci, institutionalized practices of philosophy, even in their radical forms, can be 
integrated into the apparatus of the hegemonic project of the current ruling group as a relation 
of ‘speculative command.’201 The starting point of Gramsci’s alternative critical project is 
what he describes as an ‘inventory’202 of the ‘infinity of traces’203 deposited in us by the 
historical process, and from which a more coherent conception of the world can be 
consciously formed.204 Gramsci’s discussion of personality emerges at an early stage in the 
Prison Notebooks through his reflections on Sorel’s concept of the ‘spirit of cleavage,’205 and 
his interest in the subaltern groups’ development of an ‘awareness of their own historical 
personality.’206 The difficulty of comprehending Gramsci’s conception of the subaltern 
groups is that they are defined by their passivity, and thus in a sense ‘excluded,’ yet are 
simultaneously actively constituted as passive, and thus included within the dominant 
hegemonic project. In other words, Thomas argues that the concept of passivity is ‘a social 
relation we must actively construct, in relation to other equally active social relations.’207 
Here, I would argue that Gramsci’s conception of ‘mummification’ mentioned above could 
play an important role in explaining the passive constitution of the subaltern groups.208 As 
Thomas noted above, the  
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experience of the subaltern classes, confined to the terrain of a “civil society” 
subjugated by the existing “political society” of the dominant class, is one of a 
continual molecular transformation, of disaggregations that decrease the capacity to 
act of both the individual and the class to which they belong.209  
For the subaltern groups to emerge from their condition of passivity requires the rendering 
coherent of fragmented elements of ‘spontaneous’ leadership that arise and the organization 
of this into a systematic and ‘conscious leadership.’210 Gramsci argues that the task of the 
theoretician is to ‘translate’ the healthy elements of historical life into theoretical language, 
rather than seeking to impose an ‘abstract scheme’ on reality.211 This process, aiming towards 
a hitherto unrealized unity of theory and practice, is, for Gramsci, a distinctive feature of 
Marx’s contribution that, by moving into the realm of practice, transforms both the form and 
content of philosophy itself. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Gramsci offers a powerful theoretical toolbox for re-articulating the problem of subjectivity. 
While Gramsci’s conception of the subject has often, following Althusser, been characterized 
as a form of ‘theoretical humanism,’ in this chapter, we have seen how Gramsci’s theory of 
subjectivity is one that withdraws from the conventional language of ‘subjects,’ and deploys 
an innovative theory of persons and personality on the terrain of a political struggle between 
rival hegemonies. The continuing relevance of Gramsci’s thought is demonstrated by his 
enduring power to provoke stimulating encounters with recent thinkers of the capillary 
networks of social life, such as the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. As Kate Crehan has 
demonstrated,212 Gramsci’s treatment of the problem of ‘deep knowledge’ with his 
conception of ‘common sense,’ explored above, has productive resonances with the notion of 
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‘habitus’ developed in Bourdieu’s theory of subjectivity.213 Furthermore, a comparative study 
of their thought illuminates unexpected aspects of both thinkers’ frameworks.214 
Gramsci’s philosophy acknowledges the conflictual basis of social life in realistic 
terms, acknowledging the ‘pre-intentional’ aspect of the ‘common sense’ of popular social 
groups. At the same time, it seeks to propose concrete reforms in order re-shape and elaborate 
on the intuitions of a ‘future philosophy…appropriate for a globally united human species.’215 
This involves confronting the passive condition characteristic of the subaltern groups and 
their experience of a radically incoherent and dislocated present. Yet, Gramsci also outlines 
the possibility of moving from the time in which the subaltern is considered as a ‘thing’ to 
that in which it has a feeling of itself as ‘a historical person, a protagonist.’216 While Gramsci 
does not propose a ready-made blueprint for social transformation, the laboratory of his 
thought continues to provide a conceptually productive research platform for analyzing the 
relationship between subjectivity and the political in our current conjuncture.  
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